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"Necessary Evil": The Growth of a System of
Judicial Courts and the Responses it Evoked
among the Buddhist Monastic Community in
Ancient Sri Lanka
R.A.L.H. GUNAWARDANAt
The initial steps toward the growth of a system of
judicial administration can be seen very early in the history
of Sri Lanka and, by the second and third centuries of the
Christian era, regular functioning courts could be found
even at urban centers located at considerable distance from
the capital of the kingdom at Anuradhapura. The income
from fines levied at such courts was available for disposal
by the ruler. The commentaries on the Theravdda Canon
written in Pdli in the fifth century and later, which are
based on works written in the local language at an earlier
time, reveal the prevailing atmosphere of a propensity for
litigation that caused
some concern
among the
commentators. It is most interesting to note that the
Vinaya Commentary, the Samantapasadikd, refers to a
category of people called attakdrakd, literally "lawsuitmakers," who, "owing to their acute pride, intense hatred
and predilection to cause discord," tended to get involved in
litigation.' The commentators sought to discourage this
practice among members of the monastic community. It is
perhaps significant that the discussion on "lawsuit-making"
occurs in the Bhikkhuni-vibhanga section of the
Samantapdsddikdrather than in the earlier exegesis on the
Bhikkhun-lvibhanga. Though at the end of the passage the
author of the commentary states that the observations
should apply to the monks as well, it leaves the impression
that litigation had become a serious problem even within
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the community of nuns.
Institutional provisions had been long prevalent for the
adjudication of complaints concerning transgressions of
disciplines and disputes among fellow members of the
monastic community. The ecclesiastical courts that heard
such cases were guided by the monastic disciplinary codes
preserved in the Vinaya and their interpretations
transmitted in the Theravada tradition. There is at least one
instance in an investigation in an ecclesiastical court where a
monk is given the authority by the ruler to "hear any case in
the kingdom. '2 Godattha, the learned monk in question, had
delivered a judgment on a matter involving the
determination of the monetary value of a stolen object. It was
this decision that attracted the admiration of Bhatika Tissa
(140-164 CE). Such recruitment of talented monks to work
in royal courts would have had a beneficial effect because
they brought with them the experience gathered in
ecclesiastical courts for the development of the emerging
system of judicial administration under royal direction.
It is clear from the commentarial literature that new
types of disputes had begun to demand attention. Some of
these disputes were between laymen and the monastic
community. A good number of them involved matters relating
to property. Evidently, these commentators were living at a
time when petty theft and violation of monastic property
rights were rife, providing opportunities and generating
motivation for "lawsuit-making." Such acts led at times to
violent incidents between monks and the laymen. One
commentator counsels that a monk who finds an intruder
felling trees on monastic property not seize the offender's
axe and break its cutting edge by dashing it on rocks. If
indeed he has already done so by the time he recalls this
advice, he is requested to have the axe repaired and to
return it to the owner. 3 Presumably, to a greater extent
than the monks, the nuns were considered to be easy prey
for aggressive action by laymen. Men who maintained
themselves by theft and even common village youth would
enter the property of nunneries to remove the produce, cut

2. 2 SAMANTAPASADIKA: BUDDHAGHOSA'S COMMENTARY ON THE VINAYA PITAKA,
306-07 (J. Takakusu & M. Nagai eds., 1927).
3. See Samantapasadika,supranote 1, at 910.
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down trees, and forcibly carry away equipment. 4 It is not
entirely difficult to understand that while some monks
resisted aggression by resort to force, it was the nuns who
had to seek recourse through legal action more often.
Recourse to litigation would have been one of the practical
means available to women under such circumstances.
However, recourse to the system of courts did not prove
to be a simple way out of the predicament. It would seem
that, from the point of view of the commentators, the
judicial process performed two functions: it provided
protection to people and property, and punished offenders.
In their advice to the nuns, the commentators recognized
the need for nuns to avail themselves of the first function,
but at the same time they were eager to prevent the nuns
from being associated with the punitive aspect of the
judicial process. It had been long realized by Buddhist
thinkers that punitive action associated with the judicial
process could involve resorting to violent acts that would
cause physical injury. Even if a few monks like Godattha
were working within this system, it is difficult to assess to
what extent they were able to influence its focus on
punishment. A Sri Lankan ruler known as Vohdrika Tissa,
or "Tissa, the Lawyer" (209-231 CE), had made an attempt
to develop a penal code which did away with punishments
5
that caused physical injury to the convicted offender.
Sirisanghabodhi (251-253 CE) was another ruler who
attempted to follow the nonviolent path in the administration
of justice. 6 As would be expected, such attempts were, on the
whole, unsuccessful experiments. Kings espousing the cause
of nonviolence were easily deposed. They were, at best,
ineffectual rulers. However, concerns expressed by Buddhists
about the penal system proved to be durable. We find some
writers, such as the twelfth-century author of the Sinhala
text Karmavibhdga, arguing that all violent acts, including
even the implementation of judicial punishments involving
physical injury, were evil deeds which were to be

4. See id. at 908.
5. See MAIHAVAMSA 36:8 (Wilhelm Geiger trans., 1958).
6. The Mahdvamsa presents Sirisanghabodhi as a ruler who was reluctant
to punish malefactors. This king was easily removed from power due to his
hesitation about using military force against rebels. See id. at 80:1, 91:2.
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meticulously avoided by the good Buddhist. 7
Penal measures, even the nonviolent ones, caused loss to
the convicted offenders: hence, it was argued that as a result,
bad kamma would accrue to the person who initiated a
complaint at a court of law. If the accused were to be found
guilty, the person initiating the judicial process would be
instrumental in causing injury or loss to another, even if
the penalty imposed were justified in terms of the law.
Further, involvement in litigation would arouse disaffection
among the laity. The advice tendered to Buddhist monastic
sangha, in this particular case the nuns, appears to have
been formulated after serious consideration of all these
aspects.
The nuns were permitted to request of the judicial
officials (vohdrike) that they be provided with protection
and that property taken from them be restored, but it was
essential to ensure that complaints were not directed
against any particular individual and were of an unspecific
8 If the judicial
or general nature (anodissacikkhand).
officials were to investigate such an unspecific complaint,
and then proceed to apprehend the culprits and punish
them, even to the extent of confiscating everything they
possessed, the nun would not bear any responsibility or be
guilty of an ecclesiastical offense. Similarly, if the judicial
officials were to announce by the beat of a drum that those
who perpetrate such and such deeds at the nunnery would
be punished in such and such a manner, and then
apprehend offenders and punish them, the nun would bear
no responsibility. However, under no circumstances was the
nun to initiate a lawsuit, by herself or through an
intermediary such as a functionary attached to the
nunnery. Even if judicial officials had come to see her, she
would commit an offense if she were to make a complaint to
them, either personally or through a functionary, with a
view to initiating a lawsuit. Nuns were also not allowed to
reveal the identities of criminals, even if questioned by
judicial officials. They were instead instructed to say: "It is

7. See Karmavibhaga (Sa-skya manuscript No. XXXVII) (R.AL.H. Gunawardana
ed., forthcoming).
8. See Samantapasadika,supra note 1, at 909 ('Tevalamhi mayam rakkham

ydcama, tam no detha avahata-bhandahca dhardpethdti vattabbam. evam
anodissacikkhandhoti, sd vattati.").

2007]

DALAI LAMA COMMENTARY

689

not proper for us to say who did it. You yourselves will come
to know." 9 However, if the judges told the nun that she did
not have to say anything because they themselves knew all
about it and then proceeded to give their verdict, she was
not guilty of having committed any ecclesiastical offense.
Only the person who initiated the process would be
responsible. 1° In other words, emphasis was on encouraging
nuns not to make a specific complaint against another
person.
If a nun decided to file a lawsuit and approached the
judicial officials, she committed an offense at each step. The
first complaint involved a preliminary offense in the
dukkata category; the second involved an offense of the
"grave" (thullaccaya)category; and at the conclusion of the
judicial proceedings (attapariyosdne), she was guilty of an
offense of the sanghcddisesa category, involving suspension
from the order, whatever the result of the lawsuit was."
The gravity of the offense that the nun committed through
involvement in the judicial process was not related to the
justifiability of her suit in terms of the prevailing law. For if
the person against whom she filed the suit were to be found
guilty and punished at any level higher than a fine of five
mdsakas,12 in ecclesiastical terms the nun was considered
guilty of having committed the most grievous type of
offense, the pardjika, involving the penalty of expulsion
from the order. The only exception to the rule was a
situation in which a nun unwittingly found herself involved
in a lawsuit that had gone on for quite some time earlier.
The rule prescribing expulsion from the order for
involvement in a successful lawsuit in which the other
party had been punished above a certain limit does not
appear in the Vinaya Pitaka and seems to have been a Sri
Lankan innovation. 13 Thus losses caused on someone
through the judicial process were considered to be on par
with theft. In the Vinaya it was theft of an object worth
more than five mdsakas that brought expulsion from the
9. Id.
10. See id. at 908.
11. See id. at 906-07.
12. Five masakas amounted to a fourth of a kahapanain value.
13. Even in the later Parivarasection, the penalty was sanghadisesa.See 5
VINAYA PITAKA 72, 83 (1883).
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order on an offending monk. Considered purely from a
layman's point of view, these provisions would appear
illogical, since the more justified the nun's complaint in
terms of the law, and the more grievous the offense giving
rise to the complaint, the guiltier she was in the eyes of the
Vinaya. On the other hand, from the commentator's point of
view, judicial punishment was a form of violence and, as
such, it was abhorrent; and the graver the violence, the
greater the gravity of the responsibility of those involved in
that process.
The gradation of ecclesiastical offenses involving
association with the judicial process was perhaps designed
to encourage one who had filed a lawsuit to withdraw it at
an early stage. The prescription of such a grave course of
action as expulsion from the order perhaps reflects a
situation in which litigation had become a serious problem
within the community of nuns in ancient Sri Lanka. It may
also be pointed out that the underlying assumption of the
commentator was that access to courts was easy. The
scenarios outlined by him involved situations of nuns going
to courts, the judicial officials visiting the nunnery to collect
information, and announcements being made to ensure
protection for the nunnery. They carry the implication that
by this time a regular system of judicial courts with a penal
code, designed14 to provide security for person and property,
had emerged.

14. This paper draws on material presented in an earlier contribution by the
author. See R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, Subtile Silks of Ferreous Firmness:
Buddhist Nuns in Ancient and Early Medieval Sri Lanka and their Role in the
Propagationof Buddhism, 14 SRI LANKA J. HUMAN. 1990 (1988).

